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1. Introduction 
 
The financial turmoil that we have been living with since August 2007 has left central 
banks, regulators, politicians, and economists with two big, overriding questions: How do 
we best get out of the crisis and how should banks be regulated and markets organized to 
avoid such crises in the future. This paper deals with the second question. Specifically, 
the paper deals with the third pillar of Bank supervision under Basel II, namely market 
discipline. The idea of this pillar, as summarized by Emmons, Gilbert, and Vaughan 
(2001), is for supervisors and regulators to make use of information about the financial 
health of banks that is contained in securities prices.  In particular, as explained by 
Emmons et al:  “The recent market discipline discussion centers on proposals to require 
some banks to issue a standardized form of subordinated debt.”  Flannery (1998) 
discusses this more broadly and reviews the evidence on the effectiveness of using 
market information in prudential supervision.  My proposal here is that the market 
discipline approach could usefully look for information about banks’ financial health 
outside of the securities markets.  The market that I would suggest is especially valuable 
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Dublin, and Research Fellow, CEPR. This paper was prepared for the conference “Beyond Financial 
Turmoil” organized by the Irish Banking Federation, 22 October 2008.  I would like to thank Peter Molnar 
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is the market for liquidity.  This is motivated by the simple observation that the financial 
crisis of 07/08 has manifested itself in -- and rippled outwards from -- this market.  
 
Below, I briefly outline some features of the market for liquidity during the crisis and 
draw some comparisons to times of normalcy, before turning to my proposal. Some of 
what we see during the crisis period arguably can be explained by imperfections such as 
adverse selection, leading to credit rationing and relatively high unsecured rates. There 
are also imperfections present in the market for liquidity during times of normalcy (see, 
e.g., Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev~(2008)). Thus, as new regulation gets shaped in 
the wake of the crisis, it would appear that it is valuable to put measures in place to 
control these imperfections so that they do not flare up again. The suggestions I make in 
this paper are motivated by this concern.   
 
2. The Market for Liquidity During the Great Financial Turmoil 
My discussion is based on the market for liquidity in the euro area. The focus is on the 
behavior of different interbank rates relative to each other and relative to the European 
Central Bank’s (ECB) policy rate.   
 
Figure 1 plots seven key euro interest rates for the time period January 2004 to 14 
October 2008. Three of these are set by the ECB, namely the ECB’s policy rate 
(minimum bid rate in the main refinancing operations, pink), the marginal lending facility 
(dark blue), and the deposit facility (brown).  Until 9 October 2008, the latter two were 
always 100 basis points (bp) above and below the policy rate, respectively.  
 
The four other rates depicted are interbank rates; the Eonia (the overnight rate, light blue) 
and three 3-month rates, Euribor (red), Eonia swap (green), and Eurepo (black).2  While 
all these rates could well be referred to as short term rates, I will refer to the 3-month 
rates as longer term rates. In terms of the money market, they represent relatively long 
term funding and also it is to some extent an arbitrary choice to plot 3-month rates rather 
than 12-month rates (or even 1-month rates). 
                                                 
2 Euribor, Eonia swap, and Eurepo also exist for other maturities.  See www.euribor.org. 
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Figure 1. Key Rates in the Euro Area, January 2004 to 14 October 2008.  The figure plots seven rates, 
three of which are set by the ECB and four of which are determined in interbank trading.  The 
three rates set by the ECB are (from top to bottom): (1) The marginal lending facility (blue), 
(2) The policy rate (minimum bid rate in ECB main refinancing operations, pink), (3) The 
deposit facility (brown). The four interbank rates are: (4) 3-month Euribor (red), (5) 3-month 
Eonia swap (green), (6) 3-month Eurepo (black), and (7) the Eonia (light blue).  The Eonia 
swap rate is only available from 20 June 2005. Source: www.euribor.org 
 
 
The crisis is seen in the sharp rise in 3-month Euriobor in August 2007.  It is clear that 
this increase does not represent expectations about ECB rate hikes since the other two 3-
month rates held steady.  
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Figure 2.  Interbank rate spreads (in basis points), 20 June  2005 – 16 October 2008: (1) 3-month Euribor  
 less 3-month Eonia swap  (blue), and (2) 3-month Eonia swap less 3-month Eurepo (pink).  
Source: www.euribor.org 
 
 
Figure 2 graphs the spreads between 3-month Euribor and 3-month Eonia swap (blue) 
and between 3-month Eonia swap and 3-month Eurepo. The graphs illustrate the dramatic 
rise in the unsecured rate (Euribor) relative to a three month rate with relatively low 
credit risk (Eonia swap) and the secured rate (Eurepo). Furthermore, the figure illustrates 
that the 3-month Eonia swap and Eurepo rates were very close both during the pre-crisis 
period as well as the crisis period. 
 
Table 1 puts some numbers to what we see in the figures.  The table divides the time 
from 20 June 2005 to 13 October 2008 into three periods.  The pre-crisis period (20 June 
2005 to 30 June 2007), the first stage of the crisis (August 2007 to 12 September 2008), 
and what one could call the panic stage of the crisis, after the Lehman insolvency (15 
September 2008 to 13 October 2008).3   
 
                                                 
3 July 2007 arguably represents a transition period from relative calm to crisis and has been excluded.  Data 
from this time could be included  in the pre-crisis period without making any noticeable difference.  
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Table 1: Average Rate Spreads (basis points).  
Period 3 Month Rates Overnight Mixed 
 Euribor – 
Eonia Swap 
Eonia Swap - 
Eurepo 
Eonia - 
Policy Rate 
Eonia swap – 
Policy Rate 
7/05-6/07 5.69 
(0.04) 
1.22 
(0.03) 
7.12 
(0.26) 
22.11 
(0.41) 
8/07-12/9/08 62.05 
(0.94) 
-0.47 
(0.13) 
0.92 
(0.73) 
6.86 
(0.46) 
15/9/08-13/10/08 115.45 
(8.76) 
-7.47 
(0.76) 
8.22 
(4.86) 
-11.91 
(2.84) 
Source: www.euribor.org      Standard errors in brackets. 
 
In each of these three time periods, the table reports the means of four spreads: (1) 3-
month Euribor less 3-month Eonia swap, (2) 3-month Eonia swap less 3-month Eurepo, 
(3) Eonia less the ECB’s policy rate, and (4)  3-month Eonia swap less the policy rate.   
 
The table reveals several interesting features of the market for liquidity during and across 
the three time periods.  First, overnight rates have not been adversely affected by the 
crisis.  However, the average spread between the Eonia and the policy rate actually fell 
from a pre-crisis level of 7.12 bp to 0.92 bp during the first stage of the crisis and then 
rose back up again to 8.22 bp during the panic stage of the crisis. Thus the impact on the 
level of overnight rates has not been dramatic, arguably because of the extraordinary 
quantities of liquidity injected during the crisis by the ECB.  Furthermore, Cassola et al 
(2008) report that the volume of overnight trades involving the Eonia panel banks 
actually rose relative to standard levels in the period 8/2007 to 3/2008.  Thus, the 
overnight rate did not only drop, but the volume in the overnight segment of the 
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unsecured trade went up.  This illustrates that the cost of liquidity did not increase for 
banks that were able to roll over interbank loans on an overnight basis at the Eonia rate.4 
 
Second, while unsecured rates have shot up dramatically during the crisis, the more 
secure longer term rates have held steady. The Euribor – Eonia swap spread averages to 
5.69 bp in the pre-crisis period, shot up to 62.05 bp in the first stage of the crisis and went 
further up to 115.45 bp during the panic stage.  Meanwhile, the spread between the 3-
month Eonia swap and the policy rate went from an average of 22.11 bp during the pre-
crisis period to 6.86 bp during the first stage of the crisis period.  During the panic stage, 
it fell further to -11.91 bp, in part because of expectations of ECB rate cuts.  The behavior 
of the 3-month Eonia swap rate illustrates that banks in good standing, that could roll 
over overnight loans, but were worried about overnight volatility, could lock in low 
longer term funding costs by paying the fixed leg in an Eonia swap.  
 
Longer term liquidity could also be had during the crisis at rates around the policy rate 
for those banks that had general collateral (government bonds).   The spread between the 
3-month Eonia swap and the 3-month Eurepo fell from 1.22 bp during the pre-crisis 
period to slightly below 0 during the first stage of the crisis and all the way to -7.47 bp 
during the panic stage.  The negative swap-repo spread is in itself noteworthy as it 
suggests a higher default risk in some government paper as compared with unsecured 
interbank loans.  However, the general point here is that even though longer term 
unsecured rates, with full risk of the principal, increased dramatically during the crisis 
and especially during the panic stage of the crisis, longer term liquidity was available at 
good rates for banks that were good credits and had good collateral. 
 
The high longer term unsecured rates during the crisis have been held up in the media as 
illustrating the severity of the problem in the market for liquidity. For example, 
substantial attention has been given to the Libor – OIS spread, with a high such spread 
meant to illustrate that liquidity is dear.  It is also argued that it impedes the monetary 
                                                 
4 The Eonia is based on actual trades:  According www.euribor.org:  “It is computed as a weighted average 
of all overnight unsecured lending transactions undertaken in the interbank market, initiated within the euro 
area by the contributing banks.” 
 7
policy transmission mechanism, because it increases effective interest rates relative to 
where the central bank would like them to be.  The correlation between euro Libor and 
Euribor is 0.999 during each of the three time periods in Table 1.5  Thus, for the euro 
area, we may equally focus on the Euribor – Eonia swap spread.   As argued above, this 
spread being large is not a problem for banks that can roll over overnight loans or have 
government bonds as collateral.  
 
Nevertheless, there are reasons for why a high Euribor – Eonia swap (or Libor – OIS) 
spread can be a problem. First, as discussed above, not all banks will be able to roll over 
overnight loans or have sufficient collateral to obtain relatively cheap longer term 
funding.   Second, it represents a cost to banks that have been funding themselves 
explicitly or implicitly in the longer term money market (e.g. 3 months), for example 
through paying the floating leg in interest rate swaps or having other derivative positions, 
for example unhedged written interest rate caps, with a long exposure to 3-month, say, 
unsecured rates.  Third, a high Euribor - Eonia swap spread may have negative 
repercussions on the real sector. Banks may require higher rates from businesses and 
households and may also cut back on lending.  Furthermore, many loan contracts are 
indexed in Euribor or Libor.  Thus, a high Euribor – Eonia swap spread can have a 
negative impact on banks’ balance sheets and also on investments in real assets.   Thus, 
this problem in the market for liquidity can be a problem for the wider economy.  
 
The rise in unsecured rates relative to secured rates is consistent with a high degree of 
adverse selection with respect to the quality of banks’ balance sheets.  Indeed many 
commentators and insiders have complained about the opaqueness of banks’ balance 
sheets and the products created in securitization.  For example, as expressed by Mervyn 
King, the Governor of the Bank of England,  
 
                                                 
5 The average 3-month Euribor – euro Libor spread were -0.026 bp, 0.105 bp, and 0.582 bp, respectively, 
during the three time periods in Table 1.  
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Well we’d been through a decade of extraordinarily low interest rates and that 
had encouraged people to invest in more risky and exotic instruments in order to earn the 
sort of rates of return to which they had become accustomed before we moved into a low 
inflation, low interest rate era.  And people managed to persuade themselves that 
perhaps they weren’t taking such large risks and they were persuaded to buy and take 
onboard these new and complex financial instruments, which turned out to be both riskier 
and much more opaque than the investors had originally understood.  And we said that 
because these instruments were both riskier and more opaque and complex, it was quite 
possible that one day the markets in those instruments would become illiquid.  And hence, 
the ability to sell the instruments and realize cash would be diminished.     The Guardian, 
Tuesday, 6 November  2007. 
  
Consistent with this view, the crisis period has seen large decreases in the collateral value 
of mortgage backed securities.  Even the pfandbriefe market has been adversely affected. 
 
Imperfections in the market for liquidity are also present during times of normalcy, albeit 
to a much smaller extent and much harder to detect in the data. Studying bidder behavior 
in ECB main refinancing operations, Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev (2002, 2008) find 
evidence consistent with short squeezes or possibly credit rationing (differentiating 
between these two issues is difficult with their data). In addition, there is anecdotal 
evidence that credit rationing takes place in the market for liquidity during times of 
normalcy. It seems plausible that the issues discussed above represent, at least to some 
extent, a flaring up of imperfections that are present during times of normalcy.  This 
would be one reason for why active monitoring of the interbank market could be a 
valuable activity for supervisors and regulators to engage in, so as to be able to stop the 
rot before it sets in.  
 
3. Bank Supervision using the Market for Liquidity 
 
My proposal contains a primary and secondary element, which I discus in turn. 
 
3.1. Monitor Banks by Monitoring the Market for Liquidity 
My main proposal is to tap into the large amount of intelligence that is produced about 
the credit worthiness of banks every day by banks themselves.  There is not only time 
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variation in interbank rates relative to each other and to the policy rate, as seen above, 
there is also significant cross-sectional variation. For example, unsecured rates vary 
greatly across banks, presumably reflecting, at least in part, differences in the market’s 
assessment of their credit worthiness. Thus, these rates contain valuable information to 
supervisors and regulators. 
 
As an example of differences among banks in the price banks pay for liquidity, Fecht, 
Nyborg, and Rocholl (2008) report that in 78 ECB main refinancing operations from 
6/2000 to 12/2001, the average difference between high and low paying German banks is 
11.5 basis points (this is for two week money). It is likely that what banks are willing to 
pay in ECB’s operations reflects conditions in the interbank market.  
 
Another example of cross-sectional variation in rates paid for liquidity is provided by 
Table 2, this time using US data. The table breaks the intraday spread between high and 
low Fed funds transactions into the same time periods as for Table 1. During the pre-
crisis period, the high-low spread was 76.19 bp.  By way of comparison, the average 
target rate over this time period was 4.72%. During the first stage of the crisis, the 
average high-low spread increased to 205.97 bp, despite a fall in the average target rate to 
3.30%.  During the panic stage of the crisis, the high-low spread averaged to 460.86 bp, 
while the target rate was at 2% until 08/10/08 when it dropped to 1.5%. While the high-
low spread presented here does not necessarily reflect the spread between the average 
rates paid by different banks, it is highly suggestive of significant cross-sectional 
variation in the cost of liquidity. 
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My proposal involves collecting data on all trades in the market for liquidity, unsecured 
and secured alike, that banks are involved in.  Using this data, appropriate algorithms can 
then flag problem banks to supervisors and regulators.  Features of the data that may be 
useful to investigate include: 
 
 What rates do different banks pay for unsecured loans? Warning flags can be 
raised, for example, for banks paying unusually large rates relative to the cross-
sectional mean.  Unusual changes to the pattern of funding or to a bank’s funding 
cost percentile could also give rise to warning flags. 
 Counterparty exposure.  Large exposure to banks with high borrowing rates, for 
example, can give rise to a warning signal. 
 Repo rates: High rates or haircuts on particular securitization products can also be 
problem for a bank that holds (on or off balance sheet) large quantities of the bad 
collateral. Monitoring this can therefore also be very valuable.  
 High repo rates or haircuts on particular securitization products also suggest a 
problem at the issuing/originating bank.  
 
Table 2: Fed Funds, Intraday High-Low Spread  
Period High – Low  
Intraday, Fed Funds (basis points) 
7/05-6/07 76.19 
(3.44) 
8/07-12/9/08 205.97 
(8.94) 
15/9/08-13/10/08 460.86 
(44.09) 
Source: http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/omo/dmm/historical/fedfunds/index.cfm 
Standard error in brackets. 
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Banks that are flagged through these procedures will then have to be looked into more 
carefully. By doing this, it may be possible to intervene in a poorly performing bank or a 
particular practice before things get out of hand.  One can also apply this kind of 
monitoring to the credit derivatives market. 
 
 
3.1. Promoting a Repo Market for Non-Government Bond Collateral 
The problem described above for longer term unsecured funding, suggests that it would 
also be valuable for the banks to be less reliant on such funding.  As seen, repo rates for 
government bonds have held up well during the crisis, suggesting that the interbank 
market would be more resilient if it relied more on secured funding.  A challenge here is 
that securitization products have not been trusted as collateral during the crisis, as 
evidenced by their falling collateral values by the breakdown of the repo market for such 
collateral.  This suggests that standardization of securitization products and more reliable 
ratings of these securities would be valuable. 
 
Standardization and more reliable ratings of securitization products also has other 
advantages.  It can help promote a more resilient interbank repo market for these products 
and thereby: (i) provide supervisor and regulators with a market where they can fetch 
valuable information regarding the soundness of banks and products they have issued, (ii) 
help reduce bank balance sheet opaqueness, which in turn can help mitigate future 
extreme increases in longer term unsecured rates, (iii) help central banks such as the 
ECB, that rely on these products in their monetary policy implementation, to set more 
appropriate haircuts for eligible collateral in open market operations. 
 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
Relative to the pre-crisis period, the market for liquidity during the crisis period has seen 
large increases in longer term unsecured rates, but not in longer term secured rates – or 
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even in longer term unsecured rates with low credit risk. This suggests that fear, or 
adverse selection, with respect to banks’ balance sheets have been a key feature of the 
crisis. In this paper, I have made a broad proposal that is intended to provide early 
warning signals to supervisors and regulators with respect to concerns over individual 
banks’ credit worthiness by tapping into the information that is produced by banks 
themselves when they trade in the market for liquidity.  
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